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We study the impact of falling international trade costs and falling national transport costs on the
economic geography of countries involved in an integration process. Each country is formed by two
regions between which labor is mobile, whereas there is no international mobility. Goods can be
traded both nationally and internationally at positive, but different, costs. A decrease in trade costs
and/or in transport costs has a direct impact on prices and wages, which allows us to account for the
impact of changes in these parameters on the economic geography and welfare of each country. We
show that, as trade barriers fall, the beneﬁts of integration come after its costs. We also show that
national transport policies are of the beggar-thy-neighbor type. On both counts, policy coordination
is required in the process of economic integration.
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It is a well-documented fact that the growing openness of national economies to
international trade has a signiﬁcant impact on the location of economic activities within
countries. First, using a cross-section of 85 countries, Ades and Glaeser (1995) show that
higher tariff barriers lead to a higher degree of urban primacy. Second, studying the
‘‘cohesion group’’ of the European Union (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, but no
regional data are available for Ireland), Quah (1996) notes that the two countries that have
reached the highest rates of economic growth, Spain and Portugal, are those that have
experienced the most striking rise in regional imbalances. This is consistent with the
evidence reported by de la Fuente and Vives (1995) who observe that the process of
economic integration within the EU fosters international convergence across countries
rather than interregional convergence across regions within countries. Indeed, about half of
the divergence across European regions is due to an increased polarization within some
member-states.
All this evidence raises crucial policy issues that are often neglected when countries
decide on trade agreements and the development of transportation infrastructure. For
example, it suggests that the recent enlargement of the EU to 10 new countries and the
planned infrastructural improvements are very unlikely to leave the economic geography
of the new and the old members unaffected. Moreover, the ensuing changes will probably
differ across countries, depending on their degree of internal integration and the quality of
their already existing transportation infrastructure. Since ‘‘[t]here is undoubtedly a rich
relationship between domestic and international trade costs, market structure, and
political economy’’ (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2004, p. 748), major political
disturbances and social turmoil could be triggered by a potentially uneven distribution
of the gains and losses from enlargement as the geography of competition and employment
changes.
While the practical importance of the foregoing issues is widely recognized, the
understanding of the underlying economic mechanisms is still at an infant stage. The
reason is the theoretical difﬁculty of characterizing the equilibrium spatial distribution of
economic activity when many locations, as well as a genuine distinction between regions
and countries, are simultaneously considered. At the very least, such an approach entails:
(i) A distinction between international and interregional transaction costs and (ii) a
distinction between interregional and international labor mobility. Moreover, the analysis
requires some imperfectly competitive market structure. When taken together, these
obstacles explain the existence of a very limited set of relevant contributions, all based on
monopolistic competition, which either fail to distinguish between regions and countries
or, being based on numerical simulations, fail to provide solid ground for comparative
statics on policy sensitive parameters. For example, Martin and Rogers (1995) argue that a
major determinant of national market size is the degree of interregional integration within
countries. However, by ruling out any kind of labor mobility to focus on mobility of goods
only, they neglect a deﬁning dimension of interregional integration. Other studies
introduce labor mobility between the regions of the same country. The associated results
are mixed depending on the speciﬁcities of the models adopted. Krugman (1991) considers
a two-region closed economy where agglomeration forces arise from demand linkages
between ﬁrms and mobile workers, whereas dispersion forces arise from the costs that
ﬁrms face to reach the exogenously dispersed demand of immobile farmers. In this setup,
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model by adding a third ‘foreign’ region and assuming that labor is internationally
immobile. She shows that falling international trade costs foster agglomeration in the
country opening to trade. Krugman and Livas Elizondo (1996) replace dispersed immobile
demand with congestion costs as the source of dispersion forces and show that this is
enough to turn Paluzie’s result upside down: Lower international trade costs foster
dispersion in the country opening to trade. The reason for opposite results is the fact that
trade costs do not affect the strength of the dispersion force when it derives from
congestion costs. Finally, Monfort and Nicolini (2000) extend the original Krugman model
to two countries and four regions conﬁrming the essence of Paluzie’s (2001) result:
International trade liberalization between countries leads to more agglomeration within
each country.
All these contributions are based on the Dixit–Stiglitz–Krugman model of monopolistic
competition, which reduces the interactions between ﬁrms by neglecting their strategic
behavior and assuming constant markup pricing due to CES demand. Notwithstanding
such simpliﬁcations, results are essentially derived from cumbersome numerical simula-
tions that end up beclouding the comparative static analysis. Against this background, the
aim of the present paper is to supplement the existing literature in three respects. First, we
use a different model of monopolistic competition that can be solved analytically, which in
turn allows us to go far beyond existing studies in terms of comparative statics results.
Second, our model also allows us to introduce variable mark-ups, thus accounting
explicitly for the pro-competitive effects that interregional and international integration
may trigger. Third, our quasi-linear speciﬁcation allows for a simple aggregate welfare
analysis, which is usually especially problematic and cumbersome in models featuring
mobile agents (Charlot et al., 2006). On all three counts, our model leads to a more careful
assessment of the welfare implications of various types of economic integration in the
presence of goods and factor mobility.
The model of monopolistic competition we use has been devised by Ottaviano et al.
(2002) to obtain closed form solutions in the original core-periphery model of Krugman
(1991). In Section 2, we extend it to a richer spatial setting by borrowing some of the
deﬁning assumptions of the existing contributions discussed above. In particular, in the
wake of Monfort and Nicolini (2000), we consider two countries each made of two regions.
Countries and regions are distinguished from each other by differences in both shipping
costs and factor mobility. Speciﬁcally, goods are assumed to be mobile between both
countries and regions, whereas factors move only between regions within the same
country. Moreover, trade is hampered by ‘transport’ costs between regions and by ‘trade’
costs between countries. Albeit particular and simple, this framework is sufﬁcient to study
how changing transport and/or trade costs affect the distribution of activities within
countries and how the resulting economic geography of countries inﬂuences the pattern of
international trade as well as national and global welfare.
As in Krugman (1991), production takes place in two sectors, a perfectly competitive
sector and a monopolistically competitive one. The former employs only unskilled labor,
which is immobile both between and within countries, whereas the latter employs only
skilled labor, which is immobile between countries but mobile within them. Two remarks
on these assumptions are in order. First, although international labor mobility between
EU countries is basically free under the Rome Treaty, labor generally remains highly
immobile (Faini, 1999). Second, the relative immobility of unskilled with respect to skilled
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largely reﬂecting the current situation in the EU, which is our main point of interest.1
The fundamental difference between our framework and those deriving from Krugman
(1991) is that monopolistically competitive ﬁrms face variable rather than constant
demand elasticity. This allows us to highlight two direct competition effects: (i) Local prices
decrease with the number of local producers, in accordance with the theory of industrial
organization; and (ii) lower transport and/or trade costs lead to lower prices, as suggested
in location theory. Both effects are due to falling local markups (‘pro-competitive effect’)
whereas they would be ﬁxed with a constant demand elasticity. Thus, even though our
monopolistic competition model still abstracts from direct strategic interactions between
individual ﬁrms, it captures most of the main features of oligopolistic competition through
markups that vary with the number of ﬁrms and the level of trade barriers. As recently
argued by Winters and Chang (2000) as well as Chang and Winters (2002), such effects
seem to be crucial for measuring the impact and welfare consequences of trade
liberalization.
Section 3 solves for the equilibrium distribution of skilled workers and ﬁrms. Our key
positive result is that lower intranational transport costs foster regional agglomeration
when international trade costs are high enough, whereas lower international trade costs
promote regional dispersion when intranational transport costs are high enough. This
result qualiﬁes the existing literature surveyed above. In particular, as already pointed out,
both extensions of the original core-periphery model of Krugman (1991) by Monfort and
Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001) imply that international trade liberalization between
countries leads to more agglomeration within each country. Since our model shares with
theirs its basic structure and, in particular, their focus on immobile demand as the source
of dispersion forces, the contrast reveals the importance of allowing for variable markups.
When this is the case, the agglomeration of competing ﬁrms reduces their market power,
thus imposing a downward pressure on markups. This pro-competitive effect, which is
absent in their models, acts as an additional dispersion force. Our ﬁndings agree with some
of the conclusions obtained by Head and Mayer (2004, p. 2632) in their survey of the
empirics of agglomeration and trade: ‘‘These results point to the empirical relevance of
agglomeration forces operating through forward linkages, but these forces are likely to
stay very localized, unable to generate core-periphery patterns in Europe at a large
geographical level at least as long as labor remains so sensitive to migration costs’’
(emphasis in the original).
Further gains from building on Ottaviano et al. (2002) are reaped in the next three
sections, where we perform a detailed analysis of the welfare impacts of international
(Section 4) and intranational (Section 5) integration stressing the incentives for countries to
coordinate their transport policies (Section 6). Three results stand out. First, as in Brander
and Krugman (1983), there can be ‘excessive trade’ even though trade makes a wider
variety of products available to consumers. Speciﬁcally, deeper integration decreases
welfare when trade costs are high. By contrast, it increases welfare when trade costs have
fallen below some threshold. Additionally, the range of trade costs for which trade
liberalization raises welfare depends on the internal geography and the quality of
transportation infrastructure of the trading partners. Second, each country has always an1We disregard the analysis of immigration from outside the two countries in our model. Though potentially
very interesting, this topic is beyond the scope of this paper.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
K. Behrens et al. / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1277–1301 1281incentive to reduce its own interregional transport costs. However, such reduction is
always harmful to the other country and constitutes, therefore, a beggar-thy-neighbor
policy. The reason is that, by improving its own transportation infrastructure, a country
makes its domestic market more competitive and, therefore, reduces the operating proﬁts
of foreign ﬁrms as well as the wages they pay to their workers. Hence, there is a negative
pecuniary transport externality that materializes through the channel of internal trade.
Third, as a consequence, both countries may end up being trapped into a prisoner’s dilemma.
This calls for the international coordination of national transport policies as envisaged by
the Rome Treaty (Articles 3 and 71): ‘‘A common policy in the sphere of transport ½. . . to
or from the territory of a Member State or passing across the territory of one or more
Member States’’. It also calls for the coordination of transport policies with trade,
competition, and regional policies during the process of economic integration. Some
concluding remarks are contained in Section 7.
2. The model
The economy consists of two countries, labeled i (or j) ¼ HðomeÞ or F ðoreignÞ, each
having two regions labeled r (or s) ¼ 1; 2. When needed, variables associated with each
country and each region will be subscripted accordingly. Because of the symmetry
assumption made precise below, there is no need to name differently the regions belonging
to country H or F.
There are two production factors, skilled and unskilled labor; we denote by L (resp., by
A) the mass of skilled (resp., of unskilled) workers in each country. Because international
trade is essentially characterized by two-way trade in similar goods among similar nations,
especially within the EU, we abstract from comparative advantage of both the Ricardian
and Heckscher–Ohlin types. We therefore assume that both countries have access to the
same technology, whereas their relative factor endowments L=A are identical.
Each individual works and consumes in the region she is established in. Unskilled
workers are immobile and evenly split between regions so that each region accommodates
a mass A=2 of them. In the wake of Krugman (1991), ‘immobile labor’ A is usually
interpreted as a proxy for all non-tradable services, amenities and factors such as land
(Baldwin et al., 2003). Accordingly, our symmetric assumption is made to prevent any
region from having a priori some locational advantage in terms of market size.
Skilled workers are mobile within but immobile between countries; we denote by li 2 ½0; 1
their share in region 1 of country i ¼ H ; F . This means that the mass of skilled workers
living in country i is constant, but that its interregional distribution is endogenously
determined in equilibrium.
2.1. Preferences
Each consumer is endowed with one unit of labor, which she supplies inelastically, and
has quasi-linear preferences over a homogeneous and a differentiated consumption good.2
The subutility over the (endogenously determined) total mass N of varieties of the2We do not view the use of quasi-linear preferences as a major handicap of our model. Indeed, as recently
shown by Dinopoulos et al. (2006, p. 22), ‘‘quasi-linear preferences behave reasonably well in general-equilibrium
[trade] settings’’.
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following consumption problem:
max
qðvÞ;8v2½0;N
a
Z N
0
qðvÞdv  b g
2
Z N
0
½qðvÞ2 dv  g
2
Z N
0
qðvÞdv
 2
þ q0
s.t.
Z N
0
pðvÞqðvÞdv þ q0 ¼ y þ q0,
where a40, b4g40 are parameters; pðvÞ is the consumer price of variety v and y is the
consumer’s income, which depends on her skilled/unskilled status. In this expression, a
measures the intensity of preferences for the differentiated product with respect to the
nume´raire, whereas the condition b4g implies that workers have a preference for variety.
Because it is reasonable to have individuals consuming both goods at the market outcome,
which as a by-product eliminates the income effects in our quasi-linear speciﬁcation (Vives,
1999, p. 76), we assume that each worker has in addition to her wage a sufﬁciently large
endowment q040 of the nume´raire.
In what follows, we need to keep track of where goods are produced and where goods
are consumed. To make notation more compact, a triplet irs henceforth refers to varieties
produced in region r ¼ 1; 2 of country i and sold to region s ¼ 1; 2 of the same country;
whereas a triplet ijr refers to varieties produced in either region of country i and sold to
region r ¼ 1; 2 of country jai. As said above, there is no need to mention the region of
origin in country i ¼ H ; F in the latter case, because all ﬁrms located in that country have
the same access to each region of country jai. For example, the triplet H12 would refer to
varieties produced in region 1 and sold to region 2 of the same country H. The triplet HF2
would refer to varieties produced in either region of country H and sold to region 2 of
country F.
Using this notation, it is readily veriﬁed that the demands of a consumer in region r of
country i are given as follows: intraregional demands:
qirrðvÞ ¼ a  ðb þ cNÞpirrðvÞ þ cPir, (1) interregional demands:
qisrðvÞ ¼ a  ðb þ cNÞpisrðvÞ þ cPir, (2) international demands:
qjirðvÞ ¼ a  ðb þ cNÞpjirðvÞ þ cPir, (3)
where pisrðvÞ denotes the price a variety-v ﬁrm located in region s of country i charges to
consumers in region r of the same country; whereas pjirðvÞ denotes the price a variety-v
ﬁrm located in country j charges in region r of the other country iaj. In expressions
(1)–(3),
a  a
bþ ðN  1Þg ; b 
1
bþ ðN  1Þg ; c 
g
ðb gÞ½bþ ðN  1Þg
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r of country i, the measure of which is nir (with nH1 þ nH2 þ nF1 þ nF2 ¼ N), we have
Pir 
Z
Lir
pirrðvÞdv þ
Z
Lis
pisrðvÞdv þ
Z
Ljr[Ljs
pjirðvÞdv sar and jai (4)
which is the average consumer price (up to the factor 1=N) of all varieties in region r of
country i.
2.2. Technology
There are two sectors in the economy. The ﬁrst one supplies the homogeneous good
under perfect competition using unskilled labor as the only input of a constant-returns
technology. The unit input requirement is set to one by choice of units. In the second
sector, monopolistically competitive ﬁrms offer a continuum of varieties of the
horizontally differentiated good employing both types of labor under increasing returns
to scale. We assume that ﬁrms can costlessly differentiate their products, so that there is a
one-to-one correspondence between ﬁrms and varieties. Hence, N also stands for the mass
of ﬁrms operating in the two countries.
Each ﬁrm in the monopolistically competitive sector incurs a ﬁxed cost of f40 units of
skilled labor, whereas its marginal labor requirement is normalized to zero without loss of
generality.3 Skilled labor market clearing in both regions of country i ¼ H; F for any given
distribution li of skilled workers then requires that
ni1 ¼
liL
f
; ni2 ¼
ð1 liÞL
f
; n  ni1 þ ni2 ¼
L
f
; N ¼ 2n. (5)
Turning to the transportation technology, goods can be shipped across countries and
regions at different shipping costs. As in most new trade and economic geography models,
all shipments of the homogeneous good are assumed to be costless (Krugman, 1991; Fujita
et al., 1999). Though restrictive, this assumption vastly simpliﬁes the analysis without
strongly affecting the main conclusions that can be derived from the model of the linear
genre considered here (Picard and Zeng, 2005). The simpliﬁcation comes from the fact
that, by choosing the homogeneous good as the nume´raire, in equilibrium the unskilled
wage is equal to one everywhere.
Turning to the differentiated good, both international and interregional shipments of its
varieties are costly. Since countries and regions may be connected to one another in
various ways, conditioned by geography, infrastructure, and regional trade agreements,
there is a fairly long list of cases to investigate in general. This is why we propose to
simplify the analysis by assuming that all regions of a country have the same access to all
regions of the other country: International shipments face the same unit cost t40 in terms
of the nume´raire, regardless of the regions of origin and destination.4
Interregional shipments may, by contrast, face different costs due to differences in local
transportation infrastructure: Shipping one unit within country i ¼ H; F requires ti403The model can easily be extended to the case in which the production of qðvÞ units of variety v requires m qðvÞ
units of unskilled labor. What follows holds true provided that a is replaced by a m in the demand functions.
4Behrens et al. (2006a) extend the present framework to the case of regional asymmetries, in which one country
has a gated and one country has a landlocked region.
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tH tF
Fig. 1. Schematical representation of the space-economy.
K. Behrens et al. / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1277–13011284units of the nume´raire. For the ease of exposition, henceforth we refer to the international
cost t as the trade cost and to the interregional costs tH and tF as the transport costs. Note
that since our main interest is to analyze the interactions between international trade costs
and interregional transport costs, there is a priori no reason to assume that tH ¼ tF . Our
geography of transportation and trade is illustrated in Fig. 1: There is symmetry in
transaction costs between pairs of regions belonging to different countries, whereas
transaction costs between the two regions of the same country are country-speciﬁc.
Conceptually, the difference between trade and transportation costs is the following.
The cost t includes all impediments to trade, such as shipping costs per se, but also tariff
and non-tariff barriers, different product standards, difﬁculty of communication,
informational barriers and cultural differences. Differently, ti stands for the sole costs of
shipping the differentiated product between the two regions of the same country i.
Although both of these costs have signiﬁcantly decreased in recent decades, one should
note that they are still far from being negligible.5
One ﬁnal remark is in order. Because bilateral trade occurs between all EU-15 member
states at a sufﬁciently high level of product aggregation (e.g., at the 3-digit ISIC level), as
well as within each member-state, we ﬁnd it relevant to focus on the case in which
transport costs ti and trade costs t are sufﬁciently low for interregional and international
trade to be bilateral, regardless of the distributions lH and lF of ﬁrms.
6 The formal
conditions for this to hold will be established later.
2.3. Product and labor markets
We make three crucial assumptions: Product markets are segmented, labor markets are
local and entry as well as exit are free. The ﬁrst assumption means that each ﬁrm can set a5For example, for the developed countries we have in mind, Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a
‘consensus estimate’ of the average ad-valorem tax equivalent of total trade barriers equal to 170%. Combes and
Lafourcade (2005) observe that interregional transport costs remain high, even in countries well equipped with
high-quality infrastructure such as France.
6Note, however, that bilateral trade need not occur at more disaggregate ISIC levels, e.g. at the 6-digit level.
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vast amount of empirical evidence suggesting that international markets are segmented
(Haskel and Wolf, 2001), one might think of markets within free-trade areas as being more
integrated in that ﬁrms would be mill pricers. While this is true to some extent, even within
fairly well-integrated regional blocks, such as the EU or Canada/US, border effects remain
strong (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Head and Mayer, 2000). Even more surprising, the
evidence suggests that spatial price discrimination and border effects are pervasive within
major industrialized countries (Greenhut, 1981; Wolf, 2000). In addition to largely
contradicting the empirical evidence, using mill pricing would also render the formal
analysis somewhat more complex without adding much to our main results.
The second and third assumptions imply that skilled wages are determined in each region by
the zero-proﬁt condition of the corresponding region. More precisely, the equilibrium wages of
the skilled are determined by a local bidding process in which ﬁrms compete for workers by
offering higher wages until no ﬁrm can proﬁtably enter or exit the market. In what follows, we
denote by wir the resulting skilled wage rate prevailing in region r of country i.
Under the foregoing assumptions, a ﬁrm located in region 1 of country H maximizes
proﬁts, given by
pH1 ¼ qH11
A
2
þ lHL
 
pH11 þ qH12
A
2
þ ð1 lH ÞL
 
ðpH12  tH Þ
þ qHF1
A
2
þ lF L
 
ðpHF1  tÞ þ qHF2
A
2
þ ð1 lF ÞL
 
ðpHF2  tÞ  fwH1 ð6Þ
with respect to all four prices pH11, pH12, pHF1 and pHF2 separately. Firms located in other
regions solve symmetric maximization problems.
2.4. The market outcome
Having laid out its basic structure, we now solve the model in two steps by
distinguishing between ‘short-run’ and ‘long-run’ outcomes. The present section deals
with the short run when all labor is immobile and determines the market allocation for any
given spatial distribution lH and lF of skilled workers. In other words, lH and lF are
chosen arbitrarily at some initial values, and we ﬁnd the corresponding proﬁt-maximizing
prices and zero-proﬁt wages. In the long run, discussed in the next Section 3, skilled
workers become mobile and the values of lH and lF are endogenously determined as the
result of utility-maximizing migration decisions.
Maximization of the proﬁt (6) yields the following proﬁt-maximizing prices as a function
of the price aggregate: intraregional prices:
pH11ðPH1Þ ¼
a þ cPH1
2ðb þ cNÞ , (7) interregional prices:
pH12ðPH2Þ ¼ pH22ðPH2Þ þ
tH
2
, (8)
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t
2
; r ¼ 1; 2. (9)
Note that the price a ﬁrm sets in a region depends on the average price of this region,
which depends itself on the prices set there by all ﬁrms. Because there is a continuum of
ﬁrms, each ﬁrm is negligible and chooses its optimal price, taking aggregate market
conditions as given. At the same time, these aggregate market conditions must be
consistent with ﬁrms’ optimal pricing decisions. Hence, the (Nash) equilibrium price
aggregate PH1 must satisfy the following ﬁxed point condition:
PH1 ¼ nH1pH11ðPH1Þ þ nH2pH21ðPH1Þ þ ðnF1 þ nF2ÞpFH1ðPH1Þ. (10)
Similar conditions hold for the other regions. Under our assumption of bilateral trade
between all countries and regions, the equilibrium price aggregate can be found by
solving (10) for PH1 after using expressions (7)–(9) and recalling that
n ¼ nH1 þ nH2 ¼ nF1 þ nF2:
PH1 ¼
2an þ ðb þ 2cnÞ½ðn  nH1ÞtH þ nt
2ðb þ cnÞ . (11)
Thus, the price aggregate decreases with the mass nH1 of local ﬁrms, since these ﬁrms
can supply the local market at zero costs. Substituting (11) into (7) ﬁnally allows us to
retrieve the equilibrium prices as follows: intraregional prices:
pH11 ¼
2a þ c½ðn  nH1ÞtH þ nt
4ðb þ cnÞ , (12) interregional prices:
pH12 ¼ pH22 þ
tH
2
, (13) international prices:
pHFr ¼ pFrr þ
t
2
; r ¼ 1; 2. (14)
As expected, each of these equilibrium prices decreases with the number of ﬁrms located
in the corresponding region. Prices also depend positively on transport and trade costs,
thus accounting for intranational and international competition. In what follows, we refer
to these two effects as the pro-competitive effects. However, as lower prices and unit
transport costs lead to higher commodity volumes to ship, more resources might be needed
for this to happen. We refer to this as the transport resource effect. Finally, the equilibrium
price that country-H ﬁrms set in region r of country F does not depend on the region of
country j in which the ﬁrm is located; this is because all ﬁrms in country H have the same
access to each region of the other country.
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equilibrium consumption levels can be expressed as follows: intraregional demands:
qH11 ¼ a  bpH11 þ cn
tH
2
þ cn t
2
, (15) interregional demands:
qH12 ¼ qH22  ðb þ cNÞ
tH
2
, (16) international demands:
qHF1 ¼ qF11  ðb þ cNÞ
t
2
. (17)Not surprisingly, high trade costs raise the domestic demand for each national variety at
the expense of varieties produced abroad. This substitution effect decreases when varieties
becomes more differentiated (c decreases). Similarly, the intraregional demand for each
locally produced variety increases when internal transport costs rise.
We are now equipped to determine the conditions on t, tH and tF for trade to occur
between any two regions at these equilibrium prices. Starting with interregional transport
costs, it is easy to check that
maxftH ; tF gpttradeðtÞ 
2a þ cnt
2ðb þ cnÞ (18)
must hold for interregional trade in each country to take place, regardless of the ﬁrm
distributions lH and lF . Observe that a lower t leads to a decrease in the threshold value of
interregional transport costs for which there is interregional trade. Hence, lower trade costs
in the international marketplace may lead to a break down of internal trade when the regional
markets of a country are poorly integrated. This is because cheaper imported varieties will
displace more expensive nationally produced ones. As to international trade costs, it is
readily veriﬁed that the condition
tp 2a þ cnjstj
2b þ cn (19)
must hold for the interregional demands qijr to be positive. As can be seen from condition
(19), the feasibility of international trade depends on the value of interregional transport
costs and on the spatial distribution of industry within each country. This is because lower
interregional transport costs and the agglomeration of ﬁrms exacerbate price competition
in local markets, thus making penetration by outside ﬁrms more difﬁcult. International
trade occurs for all spatial distributions of the industry if and only if
tpttrade 
2a
2b þ cn (20)
holds. Note that the value ttrade does not depend on national transport costs because
international trade costs are not region-speciﬁc. For the reasons mentioned in Section 2.3,
we assume that both conditions (18) and (20) are always satisﬁed.
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process in which all operating proﬁts are absorbed by the wage bill. Therefore, in equilibrium
the skilled wage rate in region r ¼ 1; 2 of country i ¼ H; F satisﬁes pirðwirÞ ¼ 0. This wage is
determined by a national component, which depends on the distribution li of ﬁrms in country
i, as well as by an export component, which depends on the distribution lj of ﬁrms in the other
country. This separability property will be important in the subsequent equilibrium analysis.
Let us express the equilibrium wage in region r of country i as follows:
wir ¼
DiðliÞ þ EiðljÞ
f
; iaj, (21)
where, using (5) and (6),
DiðliÞ ¼
A
2
þ fnir
 
pirrq

irr þ
A
2
þ fnis
 
ðpirs  tiÞqirs,
EiðljÞ ¼
A
2
þ fnjr
 
ðpijr  tÞqijr þ
A
2
þ fnjs
 
ðpijs  tÞqijs
and where all quantities are evaluated at the equilibrium prices. The ﬁrst term is the revenue
from domestic sales of a ﬁrm located in country i, whereas the second term stands for its
export revenue from foreign sales. Substituting these expressions back into (21) and using the
equilibrium quantities ﬁnally yields
wir ¼
b þ cN
f
A
2
þ fnir
 
ðpirrÞ2 þ
A
2
þ fnis
 
ðpirs  tiÞ2
 
þ b þ cN
f
A
2
þ fnjr
 
ðpijr  tÞ2 þ
A
2
þ fnjs
 
ðpijs  tÞ2
 
. ð22Þ
The market equilibrium for any given distribution ðlH ; lF Þ of skilled labor is then deﬁned by
(5), (12)–(14) and (22) for all countries and regions.
3. National and global equilibria
In the long run, skilled workers within each country migrate to the region that offers
them the highest utility. Hence, we ﬁrst evaluate the indirect utilities of the skilled workers
in regions 1 and 2 of country i ¼ H; F at the market equilibrium derived in the previous
section. As shown by Ottaviano et al. (2002), the indirect utility in region r of country i is
given by V ir ¼ Sir þ wir þ q0, where
Sir ¼
a2N
2b
 aðnirpirr þ nispisr þ npjirÞ
þ b þ cN
2
½nirðpirrÞ2 þ nisðpisrÞ2 þ nðpjirÞ2 
c
2
ðnirpirr þ nispisr þ npjirÞ2 ð23Þ
is the individual consumer surplus evaluated at the market equilibrium. The indirect utility
differential between the two regions of country i ¼ H ; F is then deﬁned by
DVi ðliÞ  Vi1ðliÞ  Vi2ðliÞ (24)
which depends only upon the distribution li in country i. This property stems from the fact
that, as shown by (21), the equilibrium wage wir prevailing in region r of country i is given by
the sum of two terms, DiðliÞ and EiðljÞ, which are, respectively, independent of lj and of li.
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of the domestic distribution li only. In other words, the spatial allocation of mobile activities
within a country is not affected by the degree of agglomeration in the other country. However,
we will see below that the level of welfare prevailing in a country depends on the internal
geography of its trading partner as this directly affects equilibrium prices.
A national equilibrium is such that, in each country, no skilled worker has an incentive to
change location, conditional upon the fact that the product markets clear at the
equilibrium prices (12)–(14), while labor markets clear at the equilibrium wages (22).
Formally, a national equilibrium arises at li 2 ð0; 1Þ when DVi ðliÞ ¼ 0, or at li ¼ 0 if
DVi ð0Þp0, or at li ¼ 1 if DVi ð1ÞX0. An interior equilibrium is stable if and only if the
slope of the indirect utility differential (24) is negative in a neighborhood of the
equilibrium, whereas the two agglomerated equilibria are always stable whenever they
exist.
After substituting (5), (12)–(14) and (22) into (24), some cumbersome but standard
calculations yield
DVi ðliÞ ¼
nðb þ 2cnÞti
4fðb þ cnÞ2 li 
1
2
 
ð1ti þ 2 þ 3tÞ, (25)
where
1  5c2n2fþ 12bcn þ 2c2nA þ 6b2fþ 2bcA40,
2  4afð3b þ 4cnÞ40; 3  2cnfð2b þ 3cnÞ40
are bundles of parameters that are independent of transport and trade costs.
It follows immediately from (25) that li ¼ 12 is always an equilibrium within each
country. Since the indirect utility differential is linear with respect to li, the stability of this
equilibrium depends on the sign of 1ti þ 2 þ 3t. When this expression is negative,
dispersion is the unique stable national equilibrium in country i; by contrast, when it is
positive, the dispersed equilibrium is unstable so that the agglomeration of skilled workers
of country i is the only stable equilibrium. This implies that the economic geography of a
country depends on its transport costs as well as on trade costs, but not on the transport costs
of the other country. This result depends on the following two assumptions. The ﬁrst key-
assumption is that all ﬁrms in a country have the same access to the regional markets of the
other country. The second key-assumption is that international markets are segmented.
Assuming that national markets are integrated (i.e., ﬁrms must charge the same mill price
to all their customers living in the same country) would not affect the foregoing
separability property. However, the geography of country i would depend on transport
costs in country j if the international markets were integrated. As mentioned in the
foregoing, there is little empirical evidence supporting such a pricing policy, especially at
the international level (Engel and Rogers, 1996; Head and Mayer, 2000; Haskel and Wolf,
2001).
As the indirect utility differential in each country depends only upon its internal
distribution of economic activities, a global equilibrium consists of two independent
national equilibria (one for each country). As argued previously, agglomeration is a
national equilibrium in country i if and only if 1ti þ 2 þ 3tX0, which means that
tip
2 þ 3t
1
(26)
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tX
1ti þ 2
3
(27)
are necessary and sufﬁcient conditions for agglomeration in country i to be a stable
national equilibrium. This result may be summarized as follows.
Proposition 1 (national equilibrium). Agglomeration is a stable national equilibrium in
country i if and only if
tiptðtÞ 
2f½2að3b þ 4cnÞ þ 2cnfð2b þ 3cnÞt
5c2n2fþ 6bfðb þ 2cnÞ þ 2cAðb þ cnÞ
or, equivalently, if and only if
tXtðtiÞ 
½5c2n2fþ 6bfðb þ 2cnÞ þ 2cAðb þ cnÞti  4afð3b þ 4cnÞ
2cnfð2b þ 3cnÞ .
The two inequalities identiﬁed in Proposition 1 are ‘dual’ to the extent that each yields a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition to be imposed on transport or on trade costs for
agglomeration to arise in a country, each condition depending on the other parameter.7
The following comments are in order. First, because 1 is positive, for a given t
agglomeration within country i is more likely to be a stable national equilibrium when the
transport costs in this country are low. Everything else being equal, more intranational
competition leads domestic ﬁrms to cluster because they have a larger market (recall that
the spatial distribution of consumers within each country is endogenous), which in turn
makes the penetration by the foreign ﬁrms more difﬁcult. This concurs with the main result
of economic geography in which agglomeration arises when trading across places becomes
less expensive (Krugman, 1991; Fujita et al., 1999). The novelty is that here the occurrence
of agglomeration is lowered, namely tðtÞ decreases, as trade costs keep falling. Hence,
among other things, Proposition 1 shows how international trade impediments may affect
the internal economic geography of countries involved in the integration process.
Second, 3 being positive, for a given ti such that tðtiÞ40, agglomeration within a country
is more likely to be a stable equilibrium when trade costs are high. Everything else equal,
domestic ﬁrms react to more international competition by relaxing intranational
competition through dispersion. Then, liberalizing trade would foster dispersion within
each country, thus providing a rationale for the empirical results of Ades and Glaeser
(1995) mentioned in the Introduction. Our ﬁnding also agrees with recent work by
Bru¨lhart and Traeger (2005), who show that the ‘topographical dispersion’ of
manufacturing activities has increased within the EU member-states in recent years.
As tðtiÞ increases with ti, it also follows from Proposition 1 that the country with the
lower transport costs is agglomerated for a larger range of trade costs. This result suggests
that lowering transport costs inside a country involved in a process of international
integration could well trigger more regional imbalance within this country, unless the global
economy has reached a fairly high level of integration.
Last, because 240, (25) implies that country i exhibits agglomeration when both ti and t
are sufficiently low. Observe also that 2 increases with a whereas 1 and 3 are independent7Observe that, for both the agglomerated and dispersed conﬁgurations to arise as a spatial equilibrium, it must
be that tðtiÞottrade and tðtÞottradeðtÞ.
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Fig. 2. Example of evolution of spatial equilibria in ðt; tH Þ-space.
K. Behrens et al. / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1277–1301 1291of a (the relative value of the differentiated product). This means that agglomeration is
more likely to occur when the intensity of preferences for the differentiated product is
strong enough.
Finally, it remains to investigate the impact of a simultaneous reduction in transport and
trade costs. Assuming ﬁrst the case of a joint and equiproportionate decrease of ti and t,
we have
dð1ti þ 2 þ 3tÞ ¼ 1 dti þ 3 dt ¼ ð1 þ 3Þdt.
Because 1 þ 3o0, we thus see that an equiproportionate decrease in both (interna-
tional) trade and (national) transport costs increases the likelihood of an agglomerated
outcome in each country. However, Fig. 2 shows that the impacts of a non-
equiproportionate decrease in transport and trade costs on the internal spatial structure
of the two countries are a priori ambiguous. When trade costs fall faster than transport
costs, ﬁrms may disperse within countries (path (a) in Fig. 2), whereas when transport costs
fall faster than trade costs, ﬁrms may agglomerate (path (b) in Fig. 2).8 Stated differently,
the relative speed of interregional and international integration matters a great deal for the
countries’ internal structure.
For the foregoing discussion to be relevant, both agglomeration and dispersion must
arise as equilibrium outcomes in each country. We show in Appendix A that a sufﬁcient8The parameter values underlying Fig. 2 are chosen as follows: a ¼ b ¼ 1, g ¼ 1
2
, A ¼ 25, L ¼ 6:5, and f ¼ 1
2
.
Note, however, that the qualitative features of Fig. 2 are unaffected by parameter choice since 1, 2 and 3 are
unambiguously signed.
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larger than three times the mass of skilled workers. This reﬂects the idea that immobile
activities represent the larger share of the economy.
4. Trade costs and welfare
Our framework allows for a precise study of the welfare impacts of the various
parameters expressing the freeness of trade across regions and countries. For simplicity, in
analyzing such impacts, we neglect both the proceeds that governments obtain through
tariffs on imports and the infrastructure costs they incur to make interregional
transportation cheaper. Notice, however, that assuming that reductions in trade and/or
transport costs require the use of resources would reinforce our results.
Individual utilities being quasi-linear, the sum of consumer and producer surplus (which
is absorbed by the skilled wages) provides ‘‘an appropriate’’ measure of welfare in each
country i ¼ H; F :
W iðli; ljÞ ¼ liL½Si1ðliÞ þ wi1ðli; ljÞ þ ð1 liÞL½Si2ðliÞ þ wi2ðli; ljÞ
þ A
2
½Si1ðliÞ þ Si2ðliÞ þ 2,
where Sir, as deﬁned by (23), is the consumer surplus in region r ¼ 1; 2 of country i ¼ H; F
(recall that unskilled wages are equal to unity by choice of nume´raire). Note that the effect
of a decrease in trade costs on welfare is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand, decreasing
trade costs imply a decline in equilibrium prices (see (12)), thus raising consumers’ surplus.
On the other hand, lower equilibrium prices decrease operating proﬁts and, hence, wages
(see (22)).
Consider ﬁrst the short-run case of ﬁxed distributions ðlH ; lF Þ. To gain insights into the
relationship between trade costs and welfare, we differentiate W i with respect to t, which
yields
qW i
qt
¼ b þ 2cn
16ðb þ cnÞ ðk1ti  k2tj þ k3t k4Þ,
where
k1ðliÞ  2ðb þ cnÞ½4cn2flið1 liÞ þ cnA40,
k2ðljÞ  4cn2ðb þ cnÞfljð1 ljÞ þ cnAð2b þ cnÞ40,
k3  2ð6b2 þ 8bcn þ 3c2n2Þðfn þ AÞ40,
k4  2að3b þ 2cnÞðnfþ AÞ40.
Therefore, we have
qW i
qt
v0 if and only if tvbtiðli; ljÞ  k1ðliÞti þ k2ðljÞtj þ k4k3 ,
where btiðli; ljÞottrade for all admissible values of li and ti.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that tHptF so that btHðlH ; lF ÞpbtF ðlH ; lF Þ
for all national equilibria (see Appendix B). When t starts decreasing from ttrade, our
results then show that lowering trade costs makes each country worse off when these costs
are sufficiently high, i.e. when t4btF ðlH ; lF Þ. This is because the pro-competitive effect
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needed to support higher exports and imports. Indeed, the loss in individual welfare due to
the replacement of domestic varieties by varieties produced abroad is large when trade
costs are high (see (15) and (17)). As t falls below btF ðlH ; lF Þ, there is a ﬁrst reversal in that
welfare starts increasing in country F (the less integrated country) whereas it keeps
decreasing in H (the more integrated country). For country F, the level of trade costs is
now sufﬁciently low for the pro-competitive effect to become predominant. Finally, when t
is sufﬁciently low (i.e., when tobtH ðlH ; lF Þ), welfare levels rise in both countries when trade
costs decrease further. More generally, these results show that integrating two economies
leads to a [-shaped relationship between national welfare and trade costs, with welfare
being lowest in each country for some intermediate degree of international integration.
Stated differently, the benefits of integration come after its costs, which may explain why it is
difﬁcult to agree on integration in the ﬁrst place.
To sum-up, we have
Proposition 2 (trade costs and welfare). Assume fixed distributions ðlH ; lF Þ. When trade
costs gradually decrease, the global economy goes through three phases: (i) The level of
welfare in each country decreases; (ii) the less integrated country enjoys a welfare
improvement, whereas the welfare of the more integrated country keeps falling; and (iii)
both countries are better off.
It is worth stressing that the decrease in welfare for high levels of trade costs stems from
the fact that ﬁrms absorb shipping costs so that there is too much trade going on in
equilibrium. This is reminiscent of the inefﬁciency of ‘reciprocal dumping’ pointed out by
Brander and Krugman (1983) for the Cournot duopoly model: Lower trade costs may
reduce welfare when they remain sufﬁciently high, because the transport resource effect
due to dumping offsets the gains from tougher competition. However, as these costs fall
further, less resources are used for transportation and the beneﬁts of consuming more at
lower prices take over. Here, the same line of reasoning applies due to freight absorption as
the equilibrium prices (12)–(14) make clear.
Our analysis provides additional contributions to Brander and Krugman’s about the
impact of trade integration on welfare. First, when Brander and Krugman (1983, Section
3) consider free entry, their analysis reveals that the integration process raises
unambiguously the level of welfare in each country. However, they do not consider the
impact of integration on factor prices, so that only the consumer surplus is taken into
account in their welfare analysis.
Second, in our model the impact of trade integration on national welfare depends also
on the quality of transportation infrastructure within countries since bti depends positively
on ti and tj. Hence, the range of trade costs for which trade integration is welfare-reducing
shrinks when trade agreements concern countries having a low quality of domestic
transportation infrastructure. Interestingly, exports from the low transport cost country
increase more than the rise of its imports, which might provide an economic rationale, from
the viewpoint of the old member-states, for the recent enlargement of the EU.
Third, the internal geography of trading partners matters in the relationship between
trade integration and welfare. Indeed, Proposition 2 rests on the assumption that both
distributions lH and lF are unaffected by the fall in trade costs. However, we know from
Proposition 1 that lowering trade costs fosters the dispersion of activities within each
country. Thus, we may expect either lH , or lF , or both, to decrease from 1 to 12. In this
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decrease of trade costs leads to a shrinking of the domain over which more economic
integration appears to be harmful to each country. This result also suggests that the
welfare loss due to international integration is less likely when the national economies
exhibit a dispersed spatial pattern, thus providing a rationale for the EU’s regional
development policies within the different member-states.
5. Transport costs and welfare
Consider now a gradual decrease in transport costs in country i. As the welfare impact
may vary across countries, it is useful to distinguish between the national and the global
effects of lower ti.
5.1. National welfare
Some tedious, but standard, calculations show that, regardless of the equilibrium
conﬁguration in either country, we have
qW i
qti
o0; i ¼ H ; F .
Hence, the welfare of country i always increases when its transport costs are lowered. This is
because the transport resource effect is always more than offset by the pro-competitive
effect triggered by the lower unit transport cost: The domestic ﬁrms increase their market
shares at the expense of foreign ﬁrms (see (15) and (17)).
Consider now the impact on country jai. Because a decrease in ti, by exacerbating price
competition in country i, affects adversely the export prices of the ﬁrms located in country
jai and because this effect is the only one that impacts on the welfare of this country, we
immediately have
qW j
qti
40; i ¼ H; F and jai.
In words, we see that a country is always worse off when the other country improves the
quality of its transportation infrastructure, thus showing that such an improvement is
equivalent to a beggar-thy-neighbor policy. Put differently, we have something like a
‘‘fortress effect’’ in that accessing the increasingly integrated national market becomes more
and more difficult. Such a ﬁnding might explain the negative empirical relationship between
domestic transport infrastructure investment and foreign income obtained by Bougheas
et al. (2003) from data on 16 European countries over the period 1987–1995.
A ﬁrst conclusion therefore emerges: Each country has an incentive to decrease its
transport costs but this affects adversely the other country. The reason is rent shifting which
leads to a potential conﬂict of interests between countries.
5.2. Global welfare
The analysis of the impact of a change in ti on global welfare is more convoluted as the
total effect varies with the internal geography of the trading partners. For simplicity, we
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whereas tj is kept constant, the resulting effect being evaluated when both costs are equal.
Let
Oiðli; ljÞ 
qW i
qti
þ qW j
qti
with jai (28)
so that the evolution of W i þ W j is given by the sign of Oiðli; ljÞ. When Oiðli; ljÞo0 (resp.,
Oiðli; ljÞ40), the global welfare rises (resp., falls) when transport costs in country i
decrease. Setting tH ¼ tF ¼ t in (28), we now show that the sign of Oiðli; ljÞ varies with the
value of t and, therefore, with the internal geography of countries H and F. As tH ¼ tF ,
only two spatial patterns may arise in equilibrium, namely the two economies are dispersed
ðlH ¼ lF ¼ 12Þ or agglomerated (lH ¼ lF ¼ 1). In other words, as shown by Proposition 1,
we must distinguish the cases where t4tðtÞ and totðtÞ.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which t4tðtÞ, that is, dispersion prevails in either country.
We then have
Oið12; 12Þ ¼
nðL þ AÞðb þ cnÞ
16ð2b þ cnÞ2 ðd1t  d2  d3tÞ,
where d140, d240 and d340 are bundles of parameters that are independent of transport
and trade costs.9 Let
etd ðtÞ  d2 þ d3td1 40
be the solution to d1t  d2  d3t ¼ 0 with respect to t. It is then straightforward that
Oið12 ; 12Þ40 (resp., Oið12 ; 12Þo0) if and only if t4etd (resp., toetd). In Appendix C, we show
that etd ðtÞ4tðtÞ if and only if trade costs take fairly large values but these are such that
dispersion still prevails in both countries. In this case, global welfare decreases as long as
t4etd and increases when etd4t4tðtÞ. By contrast, when trade costs take fairly small values,
we have etdðtÞotðtÞ. Consequently, we always have t4etdðtÞ so that decreasing transport
costs within a country is always inefficient.
We now come to the case in which totðtÞ so that agglomeration prevails in the two
national economies. The analysis is similar to the one above but the results are more clear-
cut. Speciﬁcally, we prove in Appendix D that Oið1; 1Þ is always positive. Hence, when the
two countries are agglomerated, any reduction of transport costs by one country is always
beneficial to this country and to the global economy.
Our analysis may then be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. When dispersion prevails in both countries (t4tðtÞ), a unilateral decrease of
transport costs by one country, evaluated at equal transport costs in both countries, is socially
undesirable as long as t4etdðtÞ4tðtÞ but becomes desirable when tðtÞotoetd ðtÞ. When
agglomeration prevails in both countries (totðtÞ), such a decrease is always socially
desirable.9We have: d1  12b2 þ 20bcn þ 9c2n2, d2  4að3b þ 2cnÞ and d3  2cnð4b þ 3cnÞ.
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As varying trade and national transport costs have different impacts on welfare (see
Propositions 2 and 3), the following question suggests itself: should national and
international transport policies be coordinated? As in the foregoing, we assume that ti
varies unilaterally whereas tj is kept constant, the resulting effect being evaluated when
both costs are equal (tH ¼ tF ¼ t).
Our setting being symmetric, we have
qW j
qti

ti¼tj
¼ qW i
qtj

ti¼tj
with jai. (29)
Thus, substituting (29) into (28) shows that
Oiðli; ljÞ ¼
qW i
qti

ti¼tj
þ qW i
qtj

ti¼tj
with jai
also measures the impact on the welfare of country i of a simultaneous and identical
variation of ti and tj. We know that each country has an incentive to improve its welfare by
decreasing its own transport costs. However, when both countries simultaneously decrease
their transport costs, we may reinterpret the results of Proposition 3 as follows.
First, when t4etdðtÞ, each country ends up being worse off because the negative effect
inﬂicted by the other country is dominant. Put differently, the two countries are in a
prisoner’s dilemma situation. This result is explained by the fact that lowering
simultaneously both transport costs leads domestic and foreign ﬁrms to decrease their
prices. Yet, because the international price difference remains the same whereas the
interregional price difference decreases, consumers substitute national varieties for foreign
varieties. When transport costs are initially high, ﬁrms price in the elastic part of their
demand so that the revenues earned from exports fall substantially. This in turn yields
lower operating proﬁts and, hence, lower wages. Such a result can be established only in a
setup accounting for the international relationships between countries as the direct effects
of improving national transport infrastructure on domestic welfare are always positive. It
uncovers a case in which international cooperation in choosing a transportation policy is
desirable.
Second, as in the foregoing, when toetdðtÞ both countries are better off. All of this shows
that uncoordinated transport policies may have diverging consequences on the welfare level of
each country according to the initial level of the corresponding transport costs. That
coordinating transport policies is globally desirable should not come as a surprise in a
setting replete with pecuniary externalities. What is surprising is the fact that both
countries can be hurt by the absence of cooperation in designing their transportation
policies.
In Section 3, we have seen that a decrease in trade costs fosters dispersion, whereas a
decrease in transport costs promotes agglomeration. Thus, a joint decrease of all these
costs has a priori an ambiguous impact on the spatial distribution of activities within each
country and, therefore, on its welfare. To gain some insights, we evaluate how a joint
variation of t, tH and tF may affect the relationship between those costs and welfare. For
given t and ti, we have seen that a fall in tj decreases the revenues from export sales in
country iaj but does not affect its consumer surplus. Furthermore, when t decreases, the
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we set T  t ¼ tH ¼ tF and study the sign of qW i=qT :
sign
qW i
qT
 
¼ signfð2k1  2k2 þ k3ÞT  k4g,
where k1, k2, k3 and k4 are deﬁned in Section 4. Since countries are now symmetric, they
exhibit the same economic geography given by lH ¼ lF ¼ 1 or by 12. It is readily veriﬁed
that, whatever the equilibrium spatial conﬁguration, qW i=qTo0 when Tottrade. Hence,
improving both international and national transportation infrastructure is desirable, at least
when countries do not differ too much in terms of their transportation facilities.
Furthermore, we have seen in Section 4 that the welfare of a country may be negatively
affected by a decrease in trade costs. When national transport costs change in the same
direction as trade costs, this negative effect may vanish. All these results suggest that there
is a case for coordinating intranational and international transport policies within large
trading blocs such as the EU.
7. Conclusions
We have presented a model that shows how changes in the transportability of
commodities as well as in the mobility of factors within countries affect the location of
economic activities, the distribution of factors, the geography of demand and, therefore,
the pattern of trade as well as their respective welfare implications.
Our key positive result is that lower intranational transport costs foster regional
divergence when international trade costs are high enough, whereas lower international
trade costs promote regional convergence when intranational transport costs are
high enough. This clearly shows that, when production factors have different degrees
of mobility at different spatial scales of analysis, international and interregional integ-
ration play important, yet distinct, roles in explaining the evolution of geography and
welfare within each country. Since EU regional policies mainly focus on ﬁnancing transport
infrastructure in lagging regions, our analysis suggests that such a policy may fail to
deliver the expected results in terms of better regional cohesion because its impact
critically depends on the degree of international integration as well as on the degree of
national integration, both of which are likely to signiﬁcantly vary across countries within
the EU.
Our result that lower international trade costs promote regional convergence when
intranational transport costs are high enough qualiﬁes the existing literature surveyed in
Section 1. There, we pointed out that both extensions of the original core-periphery model
of Krugman (1991) by Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001) imply that
international trade liberalization between countries leads to more agglomeration within
each country. Since our model shares with theirs its basic structure and, in particular, their
focus on immobile demand as the source of dispersion forces, the contrast may appear
puzzling. This need not be the case as our setup with variable demand elasticity
encapsulates pro-competitive effects, which act as an additional dispersion force and are
absent in their models.
Turning to normative issues, three results stand out. First, as in Brander and Krugman
(1983), when trade costs are high there can be ‘excessive trade’ even though trade makes a
wider variety of products available to consumers. Second, while each country has a
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always harmful to the other country, thus constituting a beggar-thy-neighbor policy.
Third, as a consequence, both countries may end up being trapped into a prisoner’s dilemma.
This calls for the international coordination of national transport policies as envisaged by
the Rome Treaty.
Finally, it is worth noting that our key positive result relies on the pro-competitive
effects due to variable markups, which are absent in standard CES models such as
Monfort and Nicolini (2000) and Paluzie (2001). Thus, it is not driven by the use of
additive and linear transport/trade costs. This does not mean, however, that there is no
need for more ‘realistic’ speciﬁcations of those costs. For example, Behrens et al. (2006b)
introduce density economies in international transportation, which arise when shipping
costs are lower on routes processing large volumes of freight, and show that these create a
link between the internal economic geographies of the trading partners on top of the
welfare effects highlighted in the present paper. As density economies are likely to be
relevant in the case of transportation costs but much less so in the case of administrative
barriers, while tariff and non-tariff barriers certainly coexist, these results suggest that
future research should focus on a richer characterization of the various types of costs
burdening distant transactions instead of collapsing them all into a single parameter as is
usually done.Acknowledgments
We thank V. Henderson, F. Robert-Nicoud, T. van Ypersele, one referee and one
associate editor for valuable comments and suggestions. Kristian Behrens gratefully
acknowledges ﬁnancial support from the European Commission under the Marie Curie
Fellowship MEIF-CT-2005-024266. Gianmarco Ottaviano gratefully acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from MIUR. The usual disclaimer applies.Appendix A
Observe that, for both the agglomerated and dispersed conﬁgurations to arise as a
spatial equilibrium, it must be that tðtiÞottrade and tðtÞottradeðtÞ. Because 240, when
t ¼ 0 the latter inequality holds provided that 1ttradeð0Þ þ 2o0. By continuity, the two
conﬁgurations will then emerge as equilibria in the vicinity of t ¼ 0. Because the value of 1
rises with A, 1ttradeð0Þ þ 2o0 holds if and only if A exceeds some threshold value that
we denote A, which is the unique solution to 1ttradeð0Þ þ 2 ¼ 0. In particular, some
simple calculations show that A is larger than 3L; hence, we assume throughout that
A4A¯43L. Note also that tðtÞ always exceeds some positive threshold when t is
arbitrarily small, whereas tðtiÞ equals 0 as soon as ti is smaller than this threshold.Appendix B
We show here that btFXbtH for all equilibria when tFXtH . Recall ﬁrst that
tFXtH ¼) lFplH ,
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btH  k1ðlHÞtH þ k2ðlF ÞtF þ k4k3 ,
btF  k1ðlF ÞtF þ k2ðlH ÞtH þ k4k3 ,
we then have
btF btH ¼ ½k1ðlF Þ  k2ðlF ÞtF  ½k1ðlH Þ  k2ðlH ÞtHk3 ,
where
k1ðlF Þ  k2ðlF Þ ¼ 4cn2ðb þ cnÞflF ð1 lF Þ þ c2n2A,
k1ðlH Þ  k2ðlH Þ ¼ 4cn2ðb þ cnÞflH ð1 lH Þ þ c2n2A.
Because tFXtH ¼) lFplH , we obtain
k1ðlF Þ  k2ðlF ÞXk1ðlH Þ  k2ðlH Þ40
so that btFXbtH , which establishes the result.
Appendix C
To determine the sign of Oið12 ; 12Þ, we have to rank etd and t. Set Dd  etd  t. As etd is
independent of A whereas t is a decreasing function of A, Dd is an increasing function of
A. To determine the sign of Dd , we evaluate Dd at the lowest admissible value of A, which is
given by the threshold A identiﬁed in Appendix A. It is then readily veriﬁed that DdðAÞ40
if and only if t 2 ðet; ttradeÞ where
et  2acnð3b þ 4cnÞ
24b3 þ 72b2cn þ 70bc2n2 þ 21c3n3ottrade
in which case Dd40 for all values of A4A. Hence, Oið12 ; 12Þ40 as long as t4etd , thus
implying that both countries are worse off when one country unilaterally cuts its own
transport costs from high values. By contrast, when t 2 ðt;etdÞ, we obtain Oið12 ; 12Þo0 in
which case the domestic country gains more than the foreign country loses.
It remains to describe what happens when toet, that is, when DdðAÞp0. In this case, eA
exists such that DdðAÞ40 (resp., DdðAÞo0) when A4 eA (resp., Ao eA), where
eA  f
c
9að2b2 þ 21bcn þ 13c2n2Þ þ ð5bc2n2 þ 6c3n3Þt
3ð2ab þ 2cnÞ þ ð4cbn þ 3c2n2Þt 4A.
When toet, two cases may arise when A4 eA. In the former one, Oið12 ; 12Þ40 as long as
t4etd and negative otherwise. In the latter case, we always have Ao eA and Oið12 ; 12Þ40
because etdot. In other words, a decrease in one country’s transport costs is always
globally efﬁcient when the mass of unskilled is not too large.
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We have to evaluate the sign of
Oið1; 1Þ ¼
nðb þ 2cnÞA
16ðb þ cnÞ2 ðZ1t  Z2  Z3tÞ,
where
Z1  6b2 þ 8bcn þ 3c2n240; Z2  cnð4b þ 3cnÞ40; Z3  2að3b þ 2cnÞ40.
Let eta be the solution of Z1t  Z2  Z3t ¼ 0 with respect to t, namely
eta  Z2 þ Z3tZ1 40.
Clearly, Oið1; 1Þ40 (resp., Oið1; 1Þo0) if and only if t4eta (resp., toeta). To rank eta and
tðtÞ, we set Da  eta  tðtÞ. Again, eta is independent of A whereas tðtÞ is a decreasing
function of A, so that Da is an increasing function of A. Because DaðAÞ40, Da is positive
for all A4A, thus implying that Oið1; 1Þ is always positive.References
Ades, A., Glaeser, E., 1995. Trade and circuses: Explaining urban giants. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110,
195–227.
Anderson, J.E., van Wincoop, E., 2004. Trade costs. Journal of Economic Literature 42, 691–751.
Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., Martin, P., Ottaviano, G.I.P., Robert-Nicoud, F., 2003. Economic Geography and
Public Policy. Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Behrens, K., Gaigne´, C., Ottaviano, G.I.P., Thisse, J.-F., 2006a. Is remoteness a locational disadvantage? Journal
of Economic Geography 6, 347–368.
Behrens, K., Gaigne´, C., Ottaviano, G.I.P., Thisse, J.-F., 2006b. How density economies in international
transportation link the internal geography of trading partners. Journal of Urban Economics 60, 248–263.
Bougheas, S., Demetriades, P., Morgenroth, E., 2003. International aspects of public infrastructure investment.
Canadian Journal of Economics 36, 884–910.
Brander, J., Krugman, P., 1983. A ‘reciprocal dumping’ model of international trade. Journal of International
Economics 15, 313–321.
Bru¨lhart, M., Traeger, R., 2005. An account of geographic concentration patterns in Europe. Regional Science
and Urban Economics 35, 597–624.
Chang, W., Winters, L.A., 2002. How regional blocs affect excluded countries: The price effects of MERCOSUR.
American Economic Review 92, 889–904.
Charlot, S., Gaigne´, C., Robert-Nicoud, F., Thisse, J.-F., 2006. Agglomeration and welfare: The core-periphery
model in the light of Bentham, Kaldor, and Rawls. Journal of Public Economics 90, 325–347.
Combes, P.-Ph., Lafourcade, M., 2005. Transport costs: Measures, determinants, and regional policy.
Implications for France. Journal of Economic Geography 5, 319–349.
de la Fuente, A., Vives, X., 1995. Infrastructure and education as instruments of regional policy: Evidence from
Spain. Economic Policy 20, 13–51.
Dinopoulos, E., Fujiwara, K., Shimomura, K. 2006. International trade patterns under quasi-linear preferences.
Mimeo, University of Florida, available at hhttp://bear.cba.uﬂ.edu/dinopoulos/Research.htmli.
Engel, C., Rogers, J.H., 1996. How wide is the border? American Economic Review 86, 1112–1125.
Faini, R., 1999. European migrants: An endangered species. In: Baldwin, R., Cohen, D., Venables, A.J. (Eds.),
Market Integration and the Global Economy. Cambridge University Press, CEPR Publications, Cambridge.
Fujita, M., Krugman, P., Venables, A.J., 1999. The Spatial Economy. Cities, Regions and International Trade.
MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Greenhut, M.L., 1981. Spatial pricing in the United States, West Germany and Japan. Economica 48, 79–86.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
K. Behrens et al. / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 1277–1301 1301Greenwood, M.L., 1997. Internal migration in developed countries. In: Rosenzweig, M.R., Stark, O. (Eds.),
Handbook of Population and Family Economics. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 648–719.
Haskel, J., Wolf, H., 2001. The law of one price—a case study. Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103, 545–558.
Head, K., Mayer, T., 2000. Non-Europe. The magnitude and causes of market fragmentation in the EU.
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 136, 284–314.
Head, K., Mayer, T., 2004. The empirics of agglomeration and trade. In: Henderson, J.V., Thisse, J.-F. (Eds.),
Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, vol. 4. North-Holland, Amsterdam, pp. 2609–2669.
Krugman, P., 1991. Increasing returns and economic geography. Journal of Political Economy 99, 483–499.
Krugman, P., Livas Elizondo, R., 1996. Trade policy and the third world metropolis. Journal of Development
Economics 49, 137–150.
Martin, Ph., Rogers, C.A., 1995. Industrial location and public infrastructure. Journal of International
Economics 39, 335–351.
Monfort, Ph., Nicolini, R., 2000. Regional convergence and international integration. Journal of Urban
Economics 48, 286–306.
Ottaviano, G.I.P., Tabuchi, T., Thisse, J.-F., 2002. Agglomeration and trade revisited. International Economic
Review 43, 409–436.
Paluzie, E., 2001. Trade policies and regional inequalities. Papers in Regional Science 80, 67–85.
Picard, P., Zeng, D.-Z., 2005. Agricultural sector and industrial agglomeration. Journal of Development
Economics 77, 75–106.
Quah, D.T., 1996. Empirics for economic growth and convergence. European Economic Review 40, 1353–1375.
Vives, X., 1999. Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Winters, L.A., Chang, W., 2000. Regional integration and import prices: An empirical investigation. Journal of
International Economics 51, 363–377.
Wolf, H., 2000. Intranational home bias in trade. Review of Economics and Statistics 82, 555–563.
